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668 MENDOZA tI. SMALL CLAIMS COURT [49 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 24776. In Bank. Jan. 28,1958.] 
PAT P. MENDOZA, Respondent, v. SMALL CLAIMS 
COURT OF LOS ANGELES JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
Appellant; MARY ARIZA, Real Party in Interest. 
[1] Constitutional Law-ConstitutioD.aJity of Statutes-Who May 
Attack.-The rule that only a member of a class whose rights 
are invaded may question the constitutionality of a statute is 
not absolute or all inclusive, and does not preclude a court 
from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a 
judgment it lacks jurisdiction to enter. 
[2] Courts-Jurisdiction-Source: Determination of Jurisdiction. 
-If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction depends is un-
constitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, 
and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, 
it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute and 
appeal from a judgment compelling it to proceed. 
[8] Justice Courts-Small Claims Courts-Appeal-Stay of Pro· 
ceedings.-Code Civ. Proc., §§ 978, 979, governing appeals from 
small claims courts as provided in § 117j, are subject to § 1176, 
providing that a stay of proceedings on appeal is discretionary 
with the trial judge. 
[4] Id.-Small Claims Courts-Appeal-Stay of Proceedings . .,... 
Under Code Civ. Proc., §§ 117ha, 1174, 1176, 1178, a stay of 
proceedings in unlawful detainer by a small claims court is 
discretionary with that court, and there is no automatic stay 
of proceedings whether or. not an undertaking is flIed. 
[5] Constitutional Law - Due Process - Notice and Rearing.-
When public necessity demands, there may be action followed 
by a hearing; otherwise due process requires that no person 
shall be deprived of a substantial right without notice and 
hearing. . 
[6] Landlord and Tenant - Unlawful Detainer - Action Before 
Reartng.-Public necessity does not demand action before 
hearing in an unlawful detainer proceeding by a landlord to 
regain possession of leased premises for default of rent; a 
tenant's possession is a substantial right, and the right to re-
tain property already in possession is as sacred as the right to 
recover it when dispossessed. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 68 et seq.; Am.JUl., 
Constitutional Law, §§ 114, 115. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Constitutional Law, § 53; [2] Courts, 
§§ 13,20: [3,4,8] Justice Courts, § 147; [5] Constitutional Law, 
§l77; [6] Landlord and Tenant, §276j [7] Constitutional Law, 
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[7] Oonstitutional Law-Due Procesll-Rea.ring.-Tbe right to a 
hearing includes the right to appear by counsel, and an arbi-
trary refusal of such right constitutes a deprivation of due 
process. 
[8] Justice Oourts-Small Olaims. Courtll-Constitutionality of 
Statutory Amendment.-The right to counsel on appeal cannot 
save the 1955 amendment of Code Civ. Proc., § 117, giving 
jurisdiction to small claims courts in unlawful detainer pro-
ceedings, since there is no automatic stay and defendant may 
be dispossessed prior to trial de novo (Code Civ. Proc., § 1176); 
the amendment is void insofar as it purports to give jurisdic-
tion to such courts in unlawful detainer proceedings, but the 
invalidity of the amendment does not invalidate the entire 
section. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Edward T. Bishop, Frank G. Swain and 
Julius V. Patrosso, Judges. Reversed. 
Proceeding in mandamus to compel a small claims court to 
try a proceeding in unlawful detainer. Judgment granting 
writ, reversed. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and William E. 
Lamoreaux, Assistant County Counsel, for Appellant. 
Ardy V. Barton for Respondent. 
TRA YNOR, J .-In November, 1955, plaintiff brought a pro-
ceeding in unlawful detainer for default of rent in defendant 
small claims court. On December 6, 1955, the court dismissed 
the action upon its own motion on the ground that the 1955 
amendment to section 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
upon which its jurisdiction was predicated, was unconstitu-
tional. From a judgment of the superior court that a writ of 
mandate issue compelling defendant to entertain the proceed-
ing, defendant appeals. 
Section 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives justice 
court and municipal court judges jurisdiction to sit as small 
claims courts in cases for the "recovery of money only where 
the amount claimed does not exceed one hundred dollars 
($100), except that a municipal court judge sitting as a .mall 
claims court shall also have jurisdiction in proceedings in 
unlawful detainer after default in rent for residential prop-
erty where the term (If tenancy is not greater than month to 
month, and where the whole amount claimed is one hundred 
dolla" ($100) or Uss" (Italics added.) The unlawful de. 
) 
.'~ 
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tainer provision was added in 1955. The jurisdictional amounts' 
were increased to one hundred fifty dollars in 1957. .. 
The first issue to be decided is whether defendant court can 
question the constitutionality of the statute. [1] Plaintiff 
contends that defendant is not a member of a class whose 
rights are invaded by the sllatute and invokes the general 
rule that only such a member may question its constitutional-
ity. (Oalifornia State Automobile Ass'n Inter-Insurance Bu-
reatt v. Downey, 96 CaI.App.2d 876, 907 [216 P.2d 882].) The 
rule invoked by plaintiff is not absolute or all inclusive. 
(Pacific Indemnity 00. v. Myers, 211 Cal. 635, 644 [296 P. 
1084) ; People v. Globe Grain ({; Mill. 00., 211 Cal. 121, 128 
[294 P. 3) ; Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Oom., 184 
Cal. 26, 31-34 [192 P. 1021, 12 A.L.R. 1190] ; see Golden Gate 
Bridge etc. Dist. v. Felt, 214 Cal. 308, 316-317 [5 P.2d 585].) 
Nor does it preclude a court from inquiring into its own juris-
diction or compel it to enter a jUdgment that it lacks juris-
diction to enter. [2] If a statute on which a court's juris-
diction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court 
has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may deter-
mine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows 
that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute 
(People ex reI. Smith v. J11dge of the Twelfth District, 17 Cal. 
547, 551; State ex reI. Ooarsey v. Harrison, 107 Fla. 20 [144 
So. 316, 317] ; State ex reI. Turner v. Hocker, Oircuit Judge, 
36 Fla. 358 [18 So. 767, 768] ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. 
Hardison, 199 Mass. 190 [85 N.E. 410, 412, 127 Am.St.Rep. 
478] ; State ex reI. Burg v. Oity of Albuquerque, 31 N.M. 576 
[249 P. 242, 248] ; State ex reI. Tod v. Oourt of Oommon Pleas 
of Fairfield County, 15 Ohio St. 377, 379, 381) and appeal 
from a judgment compelling it to proceed. (Simpson v. Police ' 
Oourt of Riverside, 160 Cal. 530, 532 [117 P. 553] ; Modern 
Loan 00. v. Police Oourt, 12 Cal.App. 582,584 [108 P. 56].) 
One of the alleged grounds of unconstitutionality of the 
amendment to section 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure is 
that it deprives a defendant of due process of law in that he 
may be deprived of possession of his residence without ever 
having had a hearing with the right to be represented by 
counsel, since he has no right to counsel in a small claims 
court (Code Civ. Proc., § 117g) and a stay of proceedings 
pending appeal is discretionary with the small claims court 
even though an appeal bond is filed. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1176.) Plaintiff contends, however, that there is an auto-
matic stay on appeal when a proper undertaking is filed 
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cedure) and that on appeal the defendant will have a trial 
de novo in the superior court with the right to be represented 
by counsel. (Code Civ. Proc., § 976.) [3] Sections 978 
and 979, however, which govern appeals from justice courts 
and from small claims courts,.as provided in section 117j, are 
essentially similar to sections 945 and 946, which govern 
appeals from superior courts. It has been held in numerous 
cases that in unlawful detainer actions sections 945 and 946 
are subject to section 1176, which provides that a stay of 
proceedings on appeal is discretionary with the trial judge. 
The reasoning in those cases also applies to sections 978 and 
979. (Jameson v. Ohanslor-Oanfield Midway Oil 00., 173 Cal. 
612, 617 [160 P. 1066] ; Sarthou v. Reese, 151 Cal. 96, 97 [90 
P. 187] ; Bateman v. Superior Oourt, 139 Cal. 140, 143 [72 
P. 922] ; Oluness v. Bowen, 135 Cal. 660,661-662 [67 P. 1048] ; 
Gross v. Kelleher, 73 Cal. 639, 640-641 [15 P. 362] ; McDonald 
v. Hanlon, 71 Cal. 535, 536 [12 P. 515]; Woods-Drury, Inc. v. 
Superior Oourt, 18 Cal.App.2d 340, 349 [63 P.2d 1184]; 
see Code Civ. Proc., § 1174; 3 Cal.Jur.2d, p. 702; 3 Witkin, 
California Procedure, pp. 2197, 2198; Hunt, Manual of 
Unlawful Detailer Law in Calif., pp. 132-133.) [4] More-
over, the Legislature has specifically precluded the application 
of section 979 to stay proceedings in unlawful detainer actions. 
The 1955 amendment to section 117ha of the Code of Civil 
Procedure added the words "and the judgment may be en-
forced in the manner provided in section 1174 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure of the State of California." The appli-
cable part of section 1174 provides that under certain limited 
circumstances the court may, within its discretion, permit the 
tenant to be restored to his estate upon payment. In all 
other cases the judgment may be enforced immediately and 
there is no provision for an automatic stay on appeal.1 Section 
1176, which is complementary to section 1174, provides: "An 
appeal by the defendant shall not stay proceedings upon the 
'The applieable purt of sectio~ 1174 reads as follows: 
"When the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the 
payment of rent, and the lease or agreement onder which the rent is 
payable has not by its terms expired, and the notice required by Section 
1161 has not stated the election of the landlord to declare the forfeiture 
thereof, the court may • . • order that execution upon the judgment 
shall not be issued until the expiration of five days after the entry of 
judgment, within which time the tenant, or any subtenant, or any 
mortgagee of the term, or any other party interested in its continuance, 
may pay into the Alourt, for the landlord, the amount found due 810 
rent, with interest thereon, and the amount of the damages found by the 
jUl7 or the eourt for the UDlawful detainer, and the costa of the pro-
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judgment unless the judge before whom the same was rendered 
80 directs. " Section 1178 provides that the unlawful detainer 
sections are controlling over "Part 2" of the Code of Civil 
Procedure.2 Part 2 inciudes section 979 and the sections relat-
ing to appeals from justice courts. 
Under the foregoing statutes a stay of proceedings on a 
judgment in unlawful detainer by the small claims court is 
discretionary with that court, and there is no automatic stay 
of proe.eedings whether or not an undertaking is filed. 
[5] When public necessity demands, there may be action 
followed by a hearing. (Financial Indemnity Co. v. 8uperior 
Court,45 Cal.2d 395, 401 [289 P.2d 233J; Rhode Island 1m. 
Co. v. Downey, 95 Cal.App.2d 220, 235-237 [212 P.2d 965].) 
Otherwise due process requires that no person shall be de-
prived of a substantial right without notice and hearing. 
(McClatchy v. 8uperior Court, 119 Cal. 413, 418-421 [51 P. 
696, 39 L.R.A. 691]; Havemeyer v. 8uperior Court, 84 Cal. 
327, 400-401 [24 P. 121, 18 Am.St.Rep. 192, 10 L.R.A. 
627] ; People v. Law"ence, 140 Cal.App.2d 133, 136·137 [295 
P.2d 4].) [6] Public necessity does not demand action 
before hearing in this proceeding by a landlord to regain 
possession of leased premises. Nor can there be any doubt 
that possession of a tenant is a substantial right. "The 
right to retain property already in possession is as sacred as 
the right to recover it, when dispossessed." (Bocking Valley 
Coal Co. v. Rosser, 53 Ohio St. 12 [41 N.E. 263, 265, 29 L.R.A. 
386].) In Modern Loan Co. v. PoZice Court, 12 Cal.App. 
582, 587 [108 P. 56], it was conceded that the person from 
whom personal property was taken could immediately main-
tain an action of claim and delivery, but the statute was 
nevertheless held unconstitutional. "This statute, however, 
does at least purport to authorize the magistrate to determine 
the right of actual possession of the property, and actual 
possession is a most valued right and is an essential part of 
property, and no one, consistent with constitutional safe-
guards, can be deprived of the possession or title to property, 
eeedinge, and thereupon the judgment ahall be utiafied and the tenant 
be restored to his estate . 
•• But if payment as here provided be not made within five da)'s, the 
~dgment may be enforced for ita full amount, and for the possession of 
the premises. In all other eases the judgment may be enforced imme-
diately." 
'''The provisions of Part 2 of this code, relative to new trials and 
appeals, except b.sofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of 
this chapter or with rules adopted by the Judicial Counell apply to the 
JroeeediDp mentioned. WI chapter." (Oocle O1v. Proe.. t 1178.) 
) 
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or any other substantial right, without reasonable notice and 
opportunity to be heard. " 
[7] The right to a hearing includes the rjght to appear by 
counsel. (Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9·10 [75 S.Ct. 1, 
99 L.Ed. 4); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68·70 [53S.Ct. 
55,77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527] ; Cooke V. United States, 267 
U.S. 517, 537 [45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767] ; Steen V. Board of 
Civil Service Commrs., 26 Ca1.2d 716, 727 [160 P.2d 816]; 
Roberts v. Anderson, 66 F.2d 874, 876; Prudential Ins. Co. v. 
Small Claims Court, 76 Cal.App.2d 379, 381-382 [173 P.2d 
38, 167 A.L.R. 820].) In its consideration of the right to 
counsel in Powell V. Alabama, .upra, 287 U.S. at 68·69, the 
United States Supreme Court declared: "What, then does a 
hearing include f Historically and in practice, in our country 
at least, it has always included the right to the aid of counsel 
when desired and provided by the party asserting the right. 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail 
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. 
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and 
sometimes no skill in the science of law . . . If in any case, 
civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily 
to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appear· 
ing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a 
refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due 
process in the constitutional sense. " 
In Prudential Ins. Co. v. Small Claims Courl, I'Upra, 
76 Cal.App.2d at 382, upholding the small claims court act, it 
was stated: "It is urged that depriving a litigant of the right 
of counsel is a violation of due process. There can be little 
doubt but that in both civil and criminal cases the right to a 
hearing includes the right to appear by counsel, and that the 
arbitrary refusal of such right eonstitutes a deprivation of due 
process. " The requirements of due process were met, 
however, since a plaintiff need not elect to sue in a small 
claims court and a defendant has a right to appeal to the 
superior court where he may have a trial de novo and be 
represented by counsel and the automatic stay precludes 8 
deprivation of property until the appeal is determined. (Code 
Civ. Proc., §§ 117j, 978, 979.) [8] In the present case the 
right to counsel on appeal cannot save the amendment, for 
there is no automatic stay and the defendant may be dis· 
possessed prior to the trial de novo. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1176.) 
The 1955 amendment to section 117 of the Code of 
.. C.Jd--3a 
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Civil Procedure is therefore void insofar as it purports to give 
jurisdiction to small claims courts in unlawful detainer pro· 
ceedings. The invalidity of this amendment does not invali· 
date the entire section. (Speegle v. Board of Fire U'rtder. 
writers, 29 Cal.2d 34, 47·48 [172 P.2d 867] ; Dallski-n v. San 
Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal,2d 536, 555 [171 P.2d 
885].) 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and McComb, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied February 
26,1958. 
/ 
